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OPERATIONAL TESTING AND THE MYTHICAL
COMMERCIAL-OFF-THE-SHELF AIRCRAFT: THE TALE
OF THE T-3A FIREFLY
CHRISTOPHER L. HARLow*
I. INTRODUCTIONIN 1995, THE UNITED STATES Air Force purchased the T-3A
Firefly (T-3) from Slingsby Aviation Limited. The Air Force
intended this commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) trainer aircraft
to be used in its flight screening program. The Air Force hy-
pothesized that earlier candidate exposure to aerobatic flight
would reduce pilot eliminations during the later, more expen-
sive, phases of training. As a COTS acquisition, the T-3 was not
subjected to traditional operational test and evaluation
(OT&E). Additionally, because the acquisition involved ex-
penditures of only $40 million, the program fell well below the
statutory financial thresholds mandating OT&E.
The failure to operationally test the T-3 produced disastrous
results for the Air Force. Within two years, six young pilots were
dead, and the Air Force was forced to remove the T-3 from its
inventory. Following a failed attempt to sell its fleet of T-3s for
parts, the Air Force ultimately disposed of the planes as scrap
metal. A variety of factors, ranging from personnel limitations
to unique geographic issues, were blamed for the T-3's failure.
Ultimately, the exact cause of the T-3's failure is irrelevant be-
cause full and early OT&E could have exposed each of these
shortcomings.
Two basic mechanisms protect American soldiers from the
negative consequences of ill-suited and ineffective government
* Christopher Harlow is a litigation associate in the D.C. office of
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal. Prior to attending The George Washington
University Law School, he served as an Air Force captain and test manager at the
Air Force Operational Test & Evaluation Center. Harlow is a 1998 graduate of
the United States Air Force Academy. In 1997, he was assigned to the 557th
Flying Training Squadron where he flew the T-3A Firefly.
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purchases. The first, OT&E, is generally required prior to broad
production of "major defense acquisitions" and combat-desig-
nated programs. This testing is conducted by service-specific
teams with both acquisition and technical expertise. The inclu-
sion of potential operators in pre-fielding testing provides an
important layer of protection for all future soldier-operators.
Despite its benefits, OT&E is not required for relatively inex-
pensive noncombat COTS products. These products introduce
the second procurement mechanism protecting American
soldiers-contractor liability. With respect to these items, the
developer remains financially liable for injuries caused by COTS
products the government has not substantially altered. Contrac-
tor liability and OT&E combine to protect American soldiers
from ineffective and unsuitable products in most situations.
When the government-contractor defense precludes liability,
OT&E ensures products are "effective" and "suitable." Con-
versely, OT&E is generally not required for COTS products sub-
ject to contractor liability, presumably because the contractor's
financial incentives will produce effective and suitable products.
While most COTS purchases are relatively mundane, the Air
Force has purchased noncombat COTS products whose soldier-
operators are not adequately protected by either mandatory
OT&E or contractor liability. In the case of the T-3, this gap
cost the Air Force nearly $40 million and six young pilots their
lives. A slight modification in the statutory language of 10
U.S.C. § 2399 would fill this gap by expanding the scope of man-
dated OT&E. This conclusion is supported by analyses of the
purpose and capabilities of OT&E, as well as the difficulties typi-
cally encountered with COTS aircraft. The tale of the T-3 pro-
vides a poignant illustration of how expanded OT&E could
effectively address the inherent problems of COTS aircraft. The
broader application of mandatory OT&E could prevent similar
tragedies in the future.
II. OPERATIONAL TESTING
A. OPERATIONAL TESTING STATUTORY BACKGROUND
While the Department of Defense (DOD) requires OT&E of
particularly expensive acquisitions, the statutory language omits
potentially perilous items that do not satisfy the financial thresh-
olds.' The DOD mandates OT&E of major defense acquisitions
1 See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 2309, 2399 (2006).
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prior to low-rate initial production.2 Programs with total pro-
curement expenditures exceeding $540 million or research, de-
velopment, and test expenditures exceeding $115 million are
defined as "major" acquisitions for operational testing pur-
poses.' These expenditures include all "elements that will func-
tion together to produce the capabilities required to fulfill a
mission need . . . includ[ing] hardware, equipment, [and]
software."' In mandating OT&E for acquisitions exceeding
these financial thresholds, Title X assumes a broad systems per-
spective. The importance of this definition and the inadequacy
of Title X's OT&E mandate have been revealed by the Air
Force's COTS aircraft failures, particularly the T-3.6
In addition to definitive financial thresholds, agency heads
are authorized to designate an acquisition as major and thus re-
quire operational testing.6 Despite this authority, the substantial
costs of OT&E effectively exempt most programs below the fi-
nancial thresholds. This situation is illustrated by the tragic ex-
ample of the T-3. 7 With expenditures of only $40 million, the T-
3 was exempt from most OT&E requirements despite the inher-
ent dangers associated with trainer aircraft.'
Notwithstanding the financial threshold requirements, the
Secretary of Defense may waive OT&E for certain aircraft.' The
Secretary is authorized to designate certain acquisitions as "pilot
programs" exempt from OT&E. 0 Included within this exemp-
tion are "commercial-derivative aircraft," defined as "any aircraft
(including spare parts, . . ) that is or was of a type customarily
used in the course of normal business operations for other than
Federal Government purposes."" These aircraft must be type
certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
must have been sold or leased in the commercial marketplace.12
These regulations establish a broad OT&E exemption for air-
craft deemed to be COTS products. In combination with the
2 § 2399(a) (1).
3 § 2302d(a)(1)-(2).
4 § 2302(5).
5 See infra Part IV.C. (discussing the T-3's failures).
6 §§ 2399(a)(2)(A), 2302(5).
7 See infra Part IV.C.
8 See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
9 10 U.S.C. § 2430 (2006).
10 Id.
11 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355,
§ 5064(a) (4) (B) (i), 108 Stat. 3243, 3359 (1994).
12 Id.
2010] T-3A FIREFLY 525
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
statutory financial thresholds, these regulations serve to exempt
most COTS acquisitions from OT&E-including trainer aircraft
like the T-3. These exemptions prevent exposure of many of the
problems inherent to COTS aircraft-problems OT&E is ideally
suited to reveal.
B. FUNDAMENTAL OPERATIONAL TESTING PRINCIPALS
Operational testing provides a critical safeguard for acquisi-
tions exceeding the statutory financial thresholds or designated
as major by the responsible agency. Operational testing ensures
that systems satisfy the critical objectives established by future
operators.1 3 This entails an assessment of the "effectiveness"
and "suitability" of a potential acquisition "under realistic opera-
tional conditions."1 4 The "effective" and "suitable" standards
provide operational test agencies with a two-pronged framework
for evaluating a system under acquisition consideration.
In general terms, OT&E assesses the ability of the system and
its future operators to successfully execute and sustain a particu-
lar mission in an operational environment." Effectiveness di-
rectly addresses the system's ability to perform its assigned
mission." Suitability evaluates the ability of future operators to
perform this mission with the system, as well as the system's abil-
ity to integrate into the existing infrastructure and doctrine."
Suitability evaluation is enabled by employing typical military
users during operational testing.' 8 Combining a realistic mis-
sion environment with typical future operators allows OT&E to
identify a wide range of operational issues prior to system
fielding.
The Air Force primarily assigns these tasks to the Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC)." For pro-
grams requiring OT&E, AFOTEC is involved at the earliest de-
13 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 5000.2-R:
MANDATORY PROCEDURES FOR MAJOR DEFENSE ACQuISIrION PROGRAMS (MDAPS)
AND MAJOR AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS (MAIS) ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
C3.6.1 (2001).
1 Id.
15 BERNARD FOX ET AL., RAND PROJECT AIR FORCE, TEST AND EVALUATION
TRENDS AND COSTS FOR AIRCRAFT AND GUIDED WEAPONS 18 (2004).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 RALPH C. NASH ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK 375
(2d ed. 1998).
19 FOX ET AL., supra note 15, at 18.
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velopment stages.20 Through early involvement and frequent,
iterative testing, AFOTEC provides critical feedback to both de-
velopers and operators. 2 1 Air Force policy defines the purpose
of OT&E as providing a mechanism "to mature system designs,
manage risks, identify and help resolve deficiencies as early as
possible, and ensure systems are operationally mission capable
(i.e., effective and suitable)."22 Organizing OT&E as "a series of
well-defined gates" enables AFOTEC to minimize the govern-
ment's acquisition risk.23 For major acquisitions, AFOTEC pro-
vides the Air Force with a critical safeguard against defective
products.2 1
While OT&E is an effective means of exposing system defi-
ciencies, it also provides critical evaluation of the system's inter-
action with operators and the service in general. Air Force
instructions describe this additional evaluation as providing "in-
formation on organization, personnel requirements, doctrine,
and tactics."2 5 This broad perspective of OT&E derives from the
statutory definition of "major," encompassing all elements "re-
quired to fulfill a mission need."" OT&E frequently reveals per-
formance-specific deficiencies, as well as deficiencies related to
personnel training, doctrine, and organization.2 7 Early expo-
sure of these problems spurs system improvement and ulti-
mately protects military operators from ineffective and
unsuitable products.
The widespread use of COTS acquisitions creates significant
problems for traditional OT&E. With the advent of COTS ac-
quisitions, the testing community recognized the unique chal-
lenges of testing these products.28  Despite the commercial
prevalence of these products, the testing community realized
that OT&E could not be eliminated "simply because these items
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 U.S. AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 99-103: TEST AND EVALUATION 6
(2004).
23 Gregory L. Barnette, Test and Evaluation in a Dynamic Acquisition Environment,
DEF. ACQUISITION REv. J., 337, 339 (2004); see also id. at 337-48.
24 Id.
25 U.S. AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 99-109: TEST RESOURCE PLANNING
10-11 (1994).
26 10 U.S.C. § 2302(5) (2006).
27 See CHRISTOPHER L. HARLow & JOHN D. PIEGZIK, DCAPES OPERATIONAL As-
SESSMENT FINAL REPORT (2001) (demonstrating that operational testing exposes
these types of deficiencies).
28 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 99-103: TEST AND EVALUA-
TION 11 (2004).
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came from pre-established sources and some pre-exiting data is
available."2 9 Consequently, the test community insisted that mil-
itary-unique applications of COTS products be tested prior to
fielding. 0
Despite these concerns, the test community conceded that in
some situations existing contractor data could be used to reduce
the scope and expense of government testing." AFOTEC policy
specifically recognizes this conflict by requiring only sufficient
testing of COTS products focused on unique military applica-
tions." Despite the importance of testing COTS products, the
statutory requirements combined with political pressures often
reduce the likelihood of OT&E.
III. OPERATIONAL TESTING OF COMMERCIAL-OFF-THE-
SHELF PRODUCTS
Many of the benefits derived from COTS acquisitions directly
conflict with operational testing. In cases of potentially perilous
acquisitions, like the T-3, this conflict exposes military operators
to fatal program deficiencies. COTS acquisitions frequently en-
counter integration, functional, and data availability issues.3 4
These problems have had particularly pronounced conse-
quences for COTS aircraft.3 1 While these issues present signifi-
cant obstacles to COTS acquisitions, OT&E could identify these
problems earlier and effectively prevent potentially lethal
results.
A. COMMERCIAL-OFF-THE-SHELF ACQUISITIONS BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
A COTS product is generally defined as one "customarily used
for non-governmental purposes" by the general public.3 6 Addi-
tionally, publicly used products requiring only minor modifica-
tions are considered commercial items.3 7 Modifications are
29 Id.
30 Id. at 38.
31 Id.
32 AIR FORCE OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION CTR., AFOTEC INSTRUCTION
99-103: CONDUCT OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION 7 (2005).
3 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2309, 2399 (2006).
3 AIR FORCE OPERATION TEST AND EVALUATION CTR., supra note 32, at 17-18.
3 Id.
36 C. ALBERT & E. MORRIS, OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., COMMERCIAL ITEM
AcQuIsTION: CONSIDERATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 3 (2000).
3 Id.
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limited to those not significantly altering the purpose or "essen-
tial physical characteristics" of the item. 8 These definitions en-
able the government to acquire and use products, or their
closely related brethren, to fulfill governmental needs. The ac-
quisition of COTS products typically reduces production time,
expedites new technology use, lowers life-cycle costs, and creates
a wider support base within the commercial sector.3 9 The bene-
fits of COTS acquisitions, however, have been tempered by sev-
eral generally applicable integration issues.
1. Product Integration Issues
Product integration creates several unique problems for the
DOD. Rarely does a single contractor offer a consolidated com-
mercial product individually capable of satisfying a require-
ment.4 0 As a result, a DOD program typically integrates items
from multiple vendors within a custom-built system."1 Combin-
ing items from various sources ultimately impacts the perform-
ance of the completed system, and many DOD programs have
failed for lack of careful consideration of integration issues. 2
The prevailing use of COTS products typically requires integra-
tion of several complex products, and their unpredictable inter-
actions often doom DOD acquisitions.
2. Functional Disparities
The functional differences between governmental and public
use present another unique obstacle to COTS acquisitions. Suc-
cessful public use of an item may involve functionality that is
unimportant to the government, while omitting other critical
functions. 4 4 Frequently, a gap exists between the intended gov-
ernment usage and the prevailing commercial use.6 When this
functional gap is large, COTS acquisition may be inappropri-
ate.4 6 In many situations, this gap cannot be remedied by a mi-
nor modification." Similar to product integration issues, the
38 Id. at 24.
3 Id. at 2.
40 See generally id. at 3-5.
41 Id. at 4.
42 Id. at 6.
43 Id.
4 Id. at 5.
45 Id. at 7.
46 Id. at 8.
47 Id. at 8 n.17.
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functional gap encountered in DOD product usage often inhib-
its the application of COTS products to military environments.4 8
3. Data Availability Issues
Limitations in data provided by the vendor present another
problem for COTS acquisitions. While evaluating their own
products, vendors may not produce detailed test data, and often
this information "exists only in the minds of [their] engi-
neers."49 Though this practice may not rise to the level of con-
cealment, the lack of information certainly hampers subsequent
government evaluation."o The lack of adequate evaluation data,
combined with functional shortcomings and integration issues,
hinders the acquisition of effective COTS products. All three of
these shortcomings were readily apparent in the Air Force's
doomed acquisition of the T-3A Firefly and introduce unique
operational testing issues."
B. OPERATIONAL TESTING ISSUES FOR COMMERCIAL-OFF-THE-
SHELF-PRODUCTS
Political and economic pressures have led DOD leaders to
streamline the acquisition process and increase consideration of
COTS products. In many acquisitions, OT&E represents a sig-
nificant portion of program expenditures. 2 Specifically, OT&E
accounts for over 20% of total developmental costs for fixed
wing aircraft. Recent OT&E expenditures for these aircraft
range from 17% for the F-14 to 65% for the F-22.5 4 These ex-
penditures have led many to question the role of OT&E in
COTS acquisitions.
Consideration of COTS products has increased, in part, due
to the savings realized from decreased testing. 5 Of course, this
benefit is reduced by the problems inherent to COTS products
discussed earlier.5 ' Despite these shortcomings, the perception
48 Id.
49 Id. at 15.
50 Id. at 12.
51 See infra Part IV.C. (discussing the shortcomings of the T-3A Firefly).
52 Fox ET AL., supra note 15, at xv n.1.
5 Id.
54 Id. at 94.
55 Id. at 36.
56 See supra Part III.A.
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prevails that COTS acquisitions reduce testing requirements."
This view is reinforced by the fact that "[O]T&E expenditures
generally occur in the later stages of development when cost
overruns and schedule slips have already occurred."5' These
factors directly led to the subordination of OT&E to the per-
ceived benefits of COTS acquisitions.
Department of Defense policies reflect this changing land-
scape. DOD instructions mandate the use of commercial items
"to the maximum extent possible" because many commercial
items "have application [s] to DOD systems."" While complete
COTS aircraft remain rare, the use of commercial aircraft com-
ponents is increasingly common."o These components are
deemed less expensive than custom military items because they
shift developmental costs and technological risks to the private
sector." However, subsequent studies have revealed that these
products often require military-specific testing. 2 The complex
nature of governmental acquisitions negates many of these per-
ceived benefits and complicates the acquisition process.
C. COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS OF COMMERCIAL-OFF-THE-
SHELF BENEFITS
Independent studies conducted by NASA and the RAND Cor-
poration identified several common misperceptions concerning
COTS acquisitions for complex government programs." A 2001
NASA study revealed several COTS misconceptions.6 These in-
clude the following assumptions: COTS modifications can be ex-
ecuted sooner than new products can be developed;
appropriate COTS products are readily available; and literature
and data provided by the COTS vendor is accurate and applica-
ble.65 Reconsidering these assumptions led some at NASA to
conclude that in many situations COTS solutions are not neces-
sarily less risky or less expensive than custom development. 6
57 Paul D. Gutierrez, Commercial or Non-Developmental Item Acquisition Strategy: A
Look at Benefits vs. Risks-Test and Evaluation, 31 PROGRAM MANAGER 1, 1-2 (May
2002).
58 Fox ET AL., supra note 15, at 1.
- U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 13, 1 C2.9.1.4.2.1.
6o Fox ET AL., supra note 15, at 36.
61 Id.
62 See generally SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 28.
63 Gutierrez, supra note 57, at 3.
6 Id.; see also Fox ET AL., supra note 15.
65 Gutierrez, supra note 57, at 3.
66 Id.
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These conclusions parallel more recent findings in a similar
study by the RAND Corporation concerning COTS aircraft. 7
This study built upon the NASA findings and provides valuable
insight into the problems encountered by the Air Force in its
acquisition of the T-3.6 1 Specifically, in 2004, the RAND Corpo-
ration conducted a study on behalf of the Air Force to investi-
gate the common belief that COTS acquisitions reduce test
expenditures." The RAND study was commissioned, in part,
due to the increased reliance on COTS aircraft and compo-
nents. 7 0 This study revealed that profound differences in mili-
tary and commercial operations negated many of the perceived
benefits of COTS acquisitions.7 1 The RAND study found that
COTS aircraft and aircraft components often required similar
levels of testing because of these differences. 7 2
Furthermore, the RAND study revealed that for many pro-
grams, COTS acquisition strategies actually increased testing be-
cause DOD requirements spurred major redesigns.73  System
redesigns present twin risks to military acquisition programs.
First, program managers may not realize that additional testing
is required to evaluate the interaction of added technology with
the existing system. 74 These system redesigns often had unantic-
ipated collateral effects on the existing product.75 If additional
testing is not performed, military operators may be given inef-
fective or unsuitable products. In the case of aircraft and air-
craft components, these flaws could be fatal. 6 Second, if
additional testing is conducted, expenditures increase and es-
sentially negate the financial benefits of COTS acquisitions.
The RAND study concluded that "[e]ven well-proven com-
mercial products" must be tested in the unique military environ-
ment.78 While this added testing reduces the financial benefits
of COTS acquisitions, it reduces the risk that military personnel
will operate ineffective, unsuitable, and potentially lethal prod-
67 See generally Fox ET AL., supra note 15.
6 Id.
69 Id. at 4.
70 Id. at xvi.
71 Id. at 36.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Gutierrez, supra note 57, at 3.
75 ALBERT & MORRIs, supra note 36, at 20.
76 See infra Part IV.C (discussing the fatalities associated with the T-3).
77 Gutierrez, supra note 57, at 1-2.
78 FOX ET AL., supra note 15, at 39.
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ucts. The 2001 NASA study provided an initial framework to
question the basic underlying assumptions of COTS acquisi-
tions." The 2004 RAND study specifically applied many of these
questions to COTS aircraft. 0 The story behind the Air Force's
purchase of the T-3 provides a salient illustration of how these
problems can manifest in a specific acquisition with lethal
results.
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE SLINGSBY T-3A FIREFLY
The acquisition of the T-3 provides an illustrative case study of
the problems inherent to COTS aircraft and the importance of
OT&E. With respect to the T-3, senior leadership pressure and
time constraints combined to virtually eliminate OT&E en-
tirely."' Similar to the problems discussed in the RAND study,
the failure to operationally test the T-3 left several significant
problems unexposed." Ultimately, this failure produced disas-
trous results.
A. T-3A AcQuiSITION STRATEGY AND BACKGROUND
1. T-3 Background
In an attempt to improve pilot training, the Air Force re-
placed its existing flight screener with the T-3A Firefly in 1995."
In 1952, the Air Force instituted a centralized flight screening
program designed to reduce student elimination during later
phases of pilot training.8 4 The early flight exposure of Air Force
Academy cadets and recent ROTC graduates enabled the service
to identify candidates incapable of successfully completing pilot
training." This early elimination allowed the Air Force to
forego the more expensive, later phases of pilot training and
redirect these officers to other career fields. 6
79 Gutierrez, supra note 57, at 3.
80 See generally FOX ET AL., supra note 15.
81 Mark Thompson, The Deadly Trainer, TIME (Jan. 12, 1998), available at http:/
/e.a.cnn.net/ALLPOLITICS/1998/01/05/time/thompson.html.
82 Id.
83 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., BROAD AREA REVIEW OF THE EN-
HANCED FLIGHT SCREENING PROGRAM 6-7, 12 (1998).
84 Id. at 6.
85 Bud Baker, The Fall of the Firefly: An Assessment of a Failed Project Strategy, 33
PROJECT MGMT. J. 53, 53 (2002).
86 Id.
2010] T-3A FIREFLY 533
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The Air Force operated its flight screening program for forty-
two years without noteworthy difficulties.17 The Air Force Acad-
emy cadets began flying the T-41, the T-3's predecessor, in
1964.88 Despite the inherent inability and inexperience of
thousands of cadets, the T-41 was flown over the Academy Air-
field for thirty years without a single fatal accident." Despite its
spotless safety record, the T-41 was viewed by Air Force leaders
as an overly conservative plane incapable of effectively screening
pilot candidates.90
In the 1980s, a movement to replace the T-41 took hold
within the Air Force." The leading proponent, former Air
Force Chief of Staff General Merril McPeak, expressed his dis-
dain for the T41: "The T-41 is your grandmother's airplane.
Our mission is to train warrior-pilots, not dentists to fly their
families to Acapulco."9 2 According to General McPeak, the T-41
did not effectively "pinpoint those cadets who have the basic ap-
titude to become Air Force pilots."9 3
Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Oaks, the Air
Force undertook a general review of the T-41 that ultimately rec-
ommended its replacement.9 4 A 1989 Broad Area Review con-
cluded that the T-41 was an ineffective screener because of "its
high-wing design and inherent limitations."9 5 Adhering to the
principles espoused by General McPeak, the report concluded
that a fully "aerobatic trainer" was needed to screen candidates
for the rigors of follow-on pilot training." Flight screening
would no longer merely evaluate a candidate's ability to under-
stand general flight principles.9 7 By exposing cadets to earlier,
more rigorous flight screening, the T-41's successor would pro-
duce more skilled Air Force pilots and further reduce late-train-
ing eliminations.
87 Thompson, supra note 81.
88 Id.
89 Baker, supra note 85, at 53-57.
90 Thompson, supra note 81.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 6.
93 Id.
9 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 83, at 3.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Baker, supra note 85, at 53.
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2. T-3 Acquisition Strategy
The Air Force considered several acquisition avenues, ulti-
mately settling on a commercial aircraft sold by the British com-
pany Slingsby Aviation Limited." The initial Statement of Need
adhered to General McPeak's desire for a sexier flight screener
by requiring the plane to allow evaluation of a candidate's ability
to react quickly and accurately while flying complex maneu-
vers.99 Though leasing an aircraft was initially considered, the
Air Force ultimately decided to purchase a flight screener from
a commercial source. 00 This decision stemmed from the availa-
bility of several commercial aerobatic trainers and DOD policy
encouraging COTS acquisitions.o In support of its decision,
the Air Force asserted that a COTS screener would reduce ex-
penditures because it would require less extensive OT&E.o 2
The common misperception that a COTS aircraft could be in-
serted into a military environment without extensive testing fu-
eled the decision to buy an aerobatic COTS trainer."0o This
decision and the subsequent OT&E exemption resulted in trag-
edy for the Air Force and the youngest of its pilots.104
In September 1991, the Air Force released a Request for Pro-
posal.' Seven months later, Slingsby Aviation Limited was
awarded the flight screener contract for its aerobatic COTS air-
craft-later designated the T-3A Firefly.o'0 Slingsby contracted
to sell the Air Force the T-3 at a unit price of $295,000, with total
expenditures approaching $40 million.o'0 The total estimated
price reflected the Air Force's belief that the T-3 would require
less OT&E because it was Type Certified by the FAA, and it
maintained Standard Airworthiness Certificates.1 0 8 This belief
coincided with the statutory and regulatory positions of the
DOD that commercial aircraft certified by the FAA require re-
98 Thompson, supra note 81.
99 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 83, at 3.
100 Id.
101 Baker, supra note 85, at 54.
102 Id.
103 See generally id.
104 See Thompson, supra note 81.
105 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 83, at 3.
106 Id.
107 T-3A Firefly, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/
uswpns/air/trainer/t3a.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2010).
108 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 83, at 56.
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duced testing. 09 The T-3 presented the Air Force with an op-
portunity to test its assumption that COTS aircraft, certified by
the FAA, could be effectively installed in a military environment
without extensive testing. This assumption proved to be fatal as
the T-3 experienced numerous mechanical failures and signifi-
cant difficulties integrating into the military environment.
B. LIMITED TESTING OF THE SLINGSBY T-3A FIREFLY
As a COTS acquisition, the T-3 was only subjected to limited
operational testing. As with other streamlined acquisitions,
OT&E of the T-3 was abbreviated and many requirements were
explicitly waived.110 Included in this waiver was the elimination
of "missionized OT&E" prior to the purchase decision."'
Streamlined acquisition further increased program risk by not
requiring an early operational assessment.112 As a result, the T-3
acquisition proceeded to full production and fielding without
supporting OT&E." 3 According to the Air Force, "this was con-
sidered an acceptable risk ... due to the COTS/NDI nature of
the T-3A."114 While most T-3 operational test requirements were
waived, the Air Force did attempt limited testing."'
In 1993, the T-3 underwent eight days of qualification opera-
tional testing."' Not only was this initial testing extraordinarily
limited in duration, but the Air Force allowed Slingsby to con-
duct the tests independently without AFOTEC involvement." 7
This decision ignored the usual OT&E procedure of employing
typical military operators. Furthermore, the principle of con-
ducting tests in a realistic operational environment was ignored
as aerial tests were only performed at Hondo Air Force Base in
Texas and not at the Air Force Academy in Colorado."18 The
limited testing of the T-3 was "operational" in name only as it
completely failed to follow many of the fundamental principles
of OT&E.
10 See Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355,
§ 5064(a) (4) (B) (i), 108 Stat. 3243, 3359 (1994).
110 Baker, supra note 85, at 55.
111 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 83, at 13.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 14.
114 Id.
115 Baker, supra note 85, at 55.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 83, at 16.
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Though the Air Force attempted to involve AFOTEC in later
testing, these tests were ultimately cancelled due to late deliv-
ery.1 19 Eventually, funding for later OT&E was denied en-
tirely. 12 0 The extraordinarily limited testing of the T-3 was
seriously hindered by the inherent conflicts and data limitations
of contractor-conducted testing.1 2 1 Additionally, the Air Force
completely failed to test the aircraft in one of its intended envi-
ronments.1 2 2 More thorough testing of the T-3 might have ex-
posed the maelstrom of problems it would soon encounter.
Despite the readily apparent inadequacy of operational test-
ing, the Air Force accepted delivery of the first of 110 T-3s in
February 1994.123 The acquisition costs of this fleet totaled only
$32 million-well below the financial thresholds mandating op-
erational testing. 1 2  Fifty-three planes were immediately sent to
the Air Force Academy in Colorado with the remainder going to
Hondo in Texas.1 2' At the Academy, the limited operational
testing of the T-3 would soon collide with real-world military
operations.
C. THE ULTIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF T-3A
FIREFLY OPERATIONS
Problems with the T-3A Firefly became apparent soon after
Academy aerial operations began. By 1996, Academy mainte-
nance teams were making round-the-clock repairs, but were un-
able to assuage the constant problems.12 6 At the Academy, T-3
engines failed sixty-six times during takeoff or landing, forcing
officials to ground fifty-seven planes on ten occasions.12 7 These
problems were attributed to deficiencies with the T-3's engine,
fuel system, and brakes.1 28 Despite the efforts of Academy main-
tenance personnel, the problems with the T-3 proved to be
insurmountable. '2
119 Baker, supra note 85, at 55.
120 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 83, at 17.
121 Baker, supra note 85, at 55; see also T-3A Firefly, supra note 107.
122 Baker, supra note 85, at 55.
123 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 83, at 4, 23.
124 T-3A Firefly, supra note 107.
125 Id.
126 Thompson, supra note 81.
127 T-3A Firefly, supra note 107.
128 Id.
129 Thompson, supra note 81.
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The first fatal crash occurred within a year of Academy cadets
flying the T-3.13 o In twenty-seven months, three Academy planes
crashed-killing three cadets and their instructors."' On Feb-
ruary 22, 1995, Cadet Mark Dostal and Captain Dan Fischer died
in the first T-3 crash. 1 3 2 A subsequent Air Force investigation
concluded Cadet Dostal inadvertently put the plane in a spin,
and Captain Fischer was unable to recover due to inadequate
training.' 3 On September 30, 1996, Cadet Dennis Rando and
Captain Clay Smith perished in the second fatal accident. 1 3 4
Nine months later, Cadet Pace Weber and Captain Glen
Comeaux died when their engine failed at 500 feet.1 35 Immedi-
ately following this third fatal crash, T-3 operations were
suspended.1 6
During this suspension, the Air Force investigated its acquisi-
tion of the T-3."'3 The investigation revealed that Slingsby rec-
ommended 119 different changes to its COTS aircraft during its
initial testing." Though it remains uncertain how many of
these changes were incorporated into the T-3, at a minimum,
the vast quantity of recommended changes illustrates the inher-
ent difficulties of adapting commercial aircraft to a military
environment.'3
Furthermore, the systemic impact of these modifications was
not thoroughly tested. 14 0 Former T-3 command instructor pilot
Captain Pat Derock noted that no one seemed to "know what
testing went into all those different changes."1 4 ' The T-3 stands
as a paradigmatic example of the integration, functional, and
data problems inherent to COTS acquisitions. Unfortunately
for the Air Force and its young pilots, these issues produced fa-
tal results.
The investigation conducted during the suspension ultimately














phase.1 4 2 The committee suggested that full OT&E be con-
ducted-including operations at the Air Force Academy and the
evaluation of instructor pilot training.143 These recommenda-
tions were never enacted because the Air Force ultimately de-
cided to terminate aerobatic flight screening and return the
program to a focus on basic flight principles.1 4 4
Deeming the T-3 acquisition a complete failure, the Air Force
dropped the plane from its inventory in October 1999 without
ever resuming operations.'4 5 The Air Force blamed the T-3's
failure on its inappropriate COTS acquisition strategy.14 6 The
Air Force concluded that the "substantial modifications" re-
quired to operate the T-3 in a military environment negated its
COTS character and warranted full OT&E."' Following unsuc-
cessful attempts to individually sell its 110 Fireflies or sell them
for parts, the Air Force ultimately disposed of the entire fleet as
scrap metal. 48 The disastrous acquisition of the T-3A Firefly re-
sulted in a nearly $40 million loss, irreparably damaged the Air
Force's reputation, and cost six young pilots their lives.' 4 9
D. THE ROLE OF OPERATIONAL TESTING IN AvoIDING
THE TRAGEDY
The 1998 investigation uncovered a variety of different rea-
sons for the aircraft's failure. These oversights include opera-
tional, geographic, and personnel issues specific to the T-3.15 0
Ultimately, assigning complete or even substantial blame to any
individual factor is irrelevant. Full-scale operational testing
would have addressed each of these issues and almost certainly
identified the problems inherent to T-3 operations.
The 1998 investigation pointed to the extreme air traffic at
the Academy as one factor leading to the T-3's failure.'"' The
report noted that "the Academy Airfield is an extraordinarily
busy facility."1 2 In 1996 alone, the Airfield supported 173,078
142 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 83, at 5, 27.
143 Id.
14 T-3A Firefly, supra note 107.
145 Id.
146 Baker, supra note 85, at 56.
147 Id.
148 Officials Announce T-3A Firefly Final Disposition, U.S. AIR FORCE (Sept. 11,
2006), www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123026857.
149 Baker, supra note 85, at 53.
1so See, e.g., SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., supTa note 83.
151 Id. at 32.
152 Id.
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aerial missions, while the pilot training bases of Sheppard and
Laughlin respectively supported only 70,883 and 49,878 similar
activities. 153 The report also noted that "[b]y contrast, the level
of non-military operations in the vicinity of Hondo is extremely
low."I 5 4 The high level of aerial traffic at the Academy was exac-
erbated by the proximity of the Colorado Springs municipal
airport.1 5 5
The intensity of aerial activities at the Academy complicated
local T-3 operations.15 6 While this problem certainly impacted
the Academy crashes, it could have been exposed during full
OT&E. OT&E entails assessment under realistic operational
conditions and would have certainly included aerial tests at the
Academy Airfield.15 7 The Air Force ignored this fundamental
principle by conducting tests solely at Hondo."' Operational
tests at the Academy could have revealed the impact of height-
ened aerial traffic on T-3 operations.
In addition to the heightened air traffic, the Academy also
presented unique geographic considerations.1 5 9 The Academy's
elevation of 6,572 feet both limited operations and negatively
impacted the T-3's performance. 16 0 The report noted "the
Academy's vertical airspace is significantly constrained by geog-
raphy and topography."' 1 The vertical airspace limitation effec-
tively forced pilots to perform aerial operations at a lower above-
ground altitude or face the T-3's altitude-created mechanical
problems. 1 6 2 The report noted that the English-manufactured
engine was not powerful enough to do aerobatic maneuvers in
"the thin Rocky Mountain air."' The report also noted that no
accidents occurred at Hondo and that many pilots believed the
T-3 simply flew better "in the lower, and heavier, Texas air. "164
Once again operational tests conducted in a realistic environ-
ment could have exposed this problem earlier. Test flights con-
ducted in the thin air of the Rocky Mountains would have
153 Id. at 31.
154 Id. at 33.
155 Id. at 32.
156 Id.
157 See id. at 13.
1s Id. at 16.
159 Id. at 30.
160 Id. at 33.
161 Id.
162 See id. at 33-34.
163 Thompson, supra note 81.
164 Id.
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certainly uncovered the aircraft's reduced performance. Conse-
quently, operational testing would have uncovered the impact of
the Academy's elevation on aerial operations long before field-
ing, which could have avoided the T-3 tragedy.
Finally, the report concluded several personnel limitations
contributed to the T-3's failure. 65 First, the report noted the
"marked contrast" between the student environments at the
Academy and Hondo.16 6 The intense distractions of cadet-life at
the Academy often prevented quality crew rest for student pi-
lots.1 61 Conversely, Hondo students were temporarily assigned
to pilot duties and were totally devoted to flying.16 8 Addition-
ally, Academy instructor pilots were frequently academic profes-
sors assigned other military duties. 1 6  Regarding personnel
matters, General McPeak noted that "[m]aybe if you'd had
three fighter pilots in there instead of three C-141 pilots you
wouldn't have had the same result."o While General McPeak's
conclusion appears extraordinarily insensitive, it also fails to ad-
equately address the T-3's shortcomings. Assigning blame to the
student environment, instructor distraction, or inadequate in-
structor selection is irrelevant because early OT&E could have
addressed each of these problems.
Operational testing conducted by typical military users in a
realistic environment could have exposed each of the T-3 short-
comings identified in the Air Force investigation."' Opera-
tional testing is designed to identify these types of problems and
frequently exposes a myriad of training, personnel, doctrinal,
and systemic deficiencies.17 2 Such early operational testing of
the T-3 could have easily identified its air traffic, geographic,
and personnel issues prior to its tragic fielding.
165 SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 83, at 35-36.
166 Id. at 35.
167 Id.
168 Id.
16 Id. at 42.
170 Thompson, supra note 81.
171 Baker, supra note 85, at 55.
172 See HARLow & PIEGZIK, supra note 27 (demonstrating that AFOTEC opera-
tional tests identify a variety of suitability deficiencies beyond mere system
performance).
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V. CONTINUED FAILURES OF OTHER COTS
AIRCRAFT ACQUISITIONS
While the T-3 constituted a complete failure to purchase an
entire COTS aircraft, the Air Force has also struggled to inte-
grate COTS components into existing aircraft. While not result-
ing in fatalities, the T-45, C-5, and C-130J demonstrate the
difficulties of integrating COTS aircraft components and the re-
sulting financial losses. Unfortunately, the T-3 was neither the
first, nor the last, COTS acquisition failure. Concurrent with
the T-3 acquisition, the Air Force attempted a non-developmen-
tal purchase of the T-45.1 3 The T-45 Joint Primary Aircraft
Training System (JPATS) is a trainer providing intermediate
strike training.1 7 4 Similar to the T-3, the Air Force purchased an
existing foreign aircraft to become the T-45.175 Though JPATS
was designated a streamlined acquisition, significant handling
problems delayed fielding by ten years and required a 90% in-
crease in testing.17 6 Once again, FAA certification was relied
upon, but the RAND study concluded this certification only
demonstrated basic airworthiness and not compliance with strin-
gent military requirements.1 7 7 While employing an acquisition
strategy identical to the T-3, the JPATS encountered similar dif-
ficulties resulting in a decade-long fielding delay and nearly
double the projected expenditures. 178
More recently, the Air Force instituted component upgrades
of both the C-5 and C-130J.1 7 1 In the C-5 Avionics Moderniza-
tion Program, the Air Force encountered significant problems
integrating FAA certified components into an existing air-
craft.""o This program attempted to replace the C-5's analog
cockpit instruments with digital displays and equipment."' The
detachment commander, Major Chris Dobb, commented, "[w] e
had a lot of problems moving avionics from the lab to the air-
craft."182 The on-site chief engineer, Wade Smith, bluntly de-
173 FoX ET AL., supra note 15, at 36.
174 Id. at 37.
175 Id. at 36.
176 Id. at 37.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 36-37.
179 SeeJeff Rhodes, A Whole New Galaxy, CODE ONE: AN AIRPOWER PROJECTION




scribed these problems and succinctly summarized the problems
of integrating COTS components into an existing aircraft:
Commercial-off-the-shelf is a myth . . . . A commercial airliner
takes off, goes to altitude, cruises, descends, and lands. A com-
mercial system is not designed to fly to altitude, descend, and
rendezvous with a tanker, descend, and ingress at 300 feet alti-
tude. A flight management system for a commercial airliner
could choke on that mission profile."'s
Similar problems were encountered with the C-130J. The J
Model implemented software upgrades to the C-130 series of
medium range transport aircraft."' C-130J testing was only used
to supplement FAA certification, and iterative software modifica-
tions led to cascading problems causing unanticipated delays
and expenditures.18 5
The C-5 modernization and C-130 upgrade demonstrate the
substantial problems encountered while integrating COTS com-
ponents into an existing aircraft. While these problems did not
cause fatalities, they still resulted in substantial delays and in-
creased expenditures. The continued pressure for faster and
cheaper military development reveals that even after the T-3,
the myth of a COTS military aircraft persists.
VI. RETURNING TO THE T-3: ULTIMATE LIABILITY
While the ultimate legal resolution of the T-3 tragedy illus-
trates the fundamental flaws of COTS aircraft acquisitions, it
also reveals a possible solution. As a threshold matter, the Feres
Doctrine prevents military personnel from suing the govern-
ment for injuries sustained in the course of their service.186 Feres
immunity aims to protect the special relationship between
soldiers and avoid the extreme results tort liability would have
on military discipline.1 8 1 While the estates of the deceased T-3
pilots were prohibited from suing the United States, the nature
of the T-3 acquisition did not shield Slingsby Aviation from
liability.
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the Supreme Court estab-
lished the parameters of the government-contractor defense.1 8 8
183 Id.
184 FOX ET AL., supra note 15, at 38.
185 Id.
186 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
187 United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).
188 Id.
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As an initial matter, the Court rejected the extension of the Feres
Doctrine to military contractors."" The Court feared such an
extension would establish a complete shield against contractor
liability even for stock purchases.19 o From this position, the
Court established the requisites for denying contractor liability
in military accidents.
From a general standpoint, the government-contractor de-
fense described in Boyle shields contractors from liability result-
ing from discretionary design decisions made by the
government."' According to Boyle, contractor liability cannot
be imposed for defects in military equipment when: (1) the gov-
ernment approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the
product conformed to those specifications; and (3) the contrac-
tor warned the government about potential dangers known only
to the contractor.1 2 According to the Court, the first two re-
quirements ensure government consideration of the specific fea-
ture, while the third condition encourages contractors to
disclose information relevant to product liability. 9 '
In Boyle, the Court also offered a specific example when con-
tractor liability is appropriate. The Court noted that if the gov-
ernment purchased stock helicopters without substantial
modifications, the contractor would bear ultimate tort liabil-
ity.1 9 4 The Boyle test for contractor liability and the specific ex-
ample provided by the Court left little doubt that Slingsby would
be liable for the T-3 tragedy.
In 2001, a federal jury imposed liability on Slingsby for the
third fatal accident and awarded Cadet Pace Weber's parents $4
million for the loss of their son.19 5 In Weber v. Slingsby Aviation
Ltd., the court applied the Boyle test and concluded the govern-
ment did not exercise the necessary discretion to invoke the gov-
ernment-contractor defense." The court found that Slingsby
was unable to provide any evidence that the T-3 was designed in
accordance with Air Force-provided specifications or that the
189 Id.
190 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 510 (1988).
191 Id. at 511-13.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 509-10.
195 British Training Aircraft Maker Settles with US Air Force Cadet's Family After $4
Million-US, $2.7 Million Pounds, Verdict in Similar Case in Florida Court, Bus. WImE
(Mar. 2, 2001), http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedure-judges/6068
778-1.html.
196 No. 98-2223, 2001 WL 34135318, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2001).
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Air Force exercised any discretion in directing its design. 9 7
Shortly after the Weber decision, Cadet Dennis Rando's parents
reached a confidential settlement with Slingsby.198
The interaction of Boyle and Feres reveal that two basic mecha-
nisms protect American soldiers from the negative conse-
quences of ill-suited and ineffective government purchases. The
Feres Doctrine implicitly rests on the notion that some mechanism
protects American soldiers from harm caused by custom-built
military equipment. This mechanism is operational test and
evaluation. Conversely, when injuries result from a COTS acqui-
sition, contractor liability compensates military personnel for
their injuries. The T-3 tragedy illustrates that a gap exists be-
tween these two doctrines. This gap occurs when a COTS acqui-
sition failure has fatal consequences, as it did with the T-3.
Though the failure of certain COTS acquisitions can have fa-
tal results, operational testing does not provide military person-
nel with an added layer of protection. In the event of fatal
COTS acquisition failures, contractor liability only serves to
compensate the survivors and provide long-term incentives for
product improvements. Nothing protects the lives of military
personnel using these products. This result is unacceptable.
VII. SOLUTION: EXPAND MANDATORY OT&E TO
"PERILOUS" NONCOMBAT COTS ACQUISITIONS
SUCH AS TRAINER AIRCRAFT
A relatively simple statutory modification to 10 U.S.C. § 2399
would expand mandatory OT&E to products like the T-3 and
could prevent similar tragedies. Though mandating OT&E for
previously exempt COTS products would certainly increase
programmatic expenditures, several avenues exist to mitigate
these costs. Cost-effective, mandatory OT&E provides a viable
and beneficial mechanism to prevent disastrous acquisitions like
the T-3 in the future.
A. CHANGE MECHANISM: STATUTORY CHANGE
American soldiers using potentially lethal products deserve
protection beyond the mere financial compensation provided
by contractor liability. The T-3, JPATS, C-5, and C-1 30J demon-
strate that even minor modifications can alter the military-spe-
cific performance of COTS aircraft. Operational testing
197 Id.
198 British Training Aircraft Maker Settles, supra note 195.
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guarantees evaluation of the full impact of these modifications.
Operational testing also ensures evaluation of these products by
future users in an operationally realistic environment. The
motivations of test personnel spring from future personal use, as
well as use by friends and colleagues. The personal ownership
of the risks inherent to these products provides a motivation
above and beyond the financial incentive of government con-
tractors. This motivation can ensure that perilous COTS prod-
ucts, such as the T-3, are both effective and suitable prior to
fielding.
Currently, operational test and evaluation is only required for
major defense acquisition programs.' This statute should be
modified with the insertion of the phrase "or potentially perilous"
after "major" in 10 U.S.C. § 2399(a) (1). This phrase would en-
capsulate noncombat programs that are not expensive enough
to rise to the level of major according to the statute. Trainer
aircraft are the perfect example of an acquisition that is neither
major nor combat-related and therefore exempt from
mandatory operational testing. Essentially, these programs slip
through the OT&E cracks of Title X. Though not subjected to
mandatory operational testing these programs have proven to
be lethal to their soldier-operators and have cost the govern-
ment millions of dollars.
While the Air Force and the DOD learned valuable lessons
from the failure of the T-3, subsequent COTS acquisitions
demonstrate the fickle nature of these lessons. Political pres-
sures will certainly rise again and suggest saving tax dollars
through similar COTS acquisitions. However, avoiding the ex-
penses associated with operational testing does notjustify expos-
ing soldier-operators to fatally defective products. Military pilots
should never again be exposed to an aircraft that is ineffective in
its intended environment and unsuitable to be flown by the very
pilots for whom it was designed. A statutory change mandating
OT&E of these products would cement the lessons of the T-3 for
future DOD and political leaders.
B. COST-EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIONAL TESTING
Increased operational testing will certainly increase acquisi-
tion expenditures; however, this expense is not insurmountable.
Operational testing is very expensive and critics will certainly
note that mandatory OT&E would eliminate most of the finan-
- 10 U.S.C. § 2399(a) (1) (2006).
546 [ 75
cial benefits of COTS acquisitions. As noted earlier, operational
testing accounts for over one-fifth of the developmental costs for
fixed-wing aircraft. 2 00 Though mandatory OT&E would expand
these expenses to previously exempt acquisitions, several mecha-
nisms exist to reduce these costs. An expansion of the govern-
ment-contractor defense, implementation of innovative test
techniques, and the general savings reaped from fewer program
failures would allow the government to recoup a large portion
of these expenses.
First, the government-contractor defense should be expanded
to preclude liability for these "perilous" products. Mandatory
OT&E combined with an expansion of the contractor defense
shifts the responsibility for program failure from the contractor
to the government. While the Feres doctrine prevents military
personnel from suing the government,2 0 1 this prohibition is sup-
plemented by OT&E. Operational testing provides a superior
mechanism to expose design deficiencies prior to fielding. The
advent of mandatory OT&E of these products would effectively
reduce the possibility of operational accidents.
Additionally, an expansion of the government-contractor de-
fense would reduce contract-related expenses. Military suppli-
ers typically pass the cost of accidents to the government
through cost overrun provisions.2 0 2 Furthermore, the price of
liability insurance is passed to the government either in the spe-
cific contract or through higher prices in later contracts.2 0 3
Consequently, the expansion of the contractor defense would
reduce up-front contract expenses.
The test and evaluation community consists of practioner-aca-
demics constantly updating and improving test techniques.
Within this community, a variety of testing innovations have
been developed and implemented.o OT&E experts have also
suggested implementing iterative, mathematical techniques that
can improve the effectiveness of OT&E and ultimately stream-
line testing.205 Mathematical and analytical techniques em-
200 FoX ET AL., supra note 15, at xv n.1.
201 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
202 McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983).
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204 See Christopher L. Harlow & Santa Falcone, A Correlated Strategic Guide to
Software Testing, CROSSTALK, July 2005, at 18-21 (discussing various emerging
practices and suggesting a new cost-effective iterative, mathematical model).
205 Id.
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ployed during testing can be used to better focus OT&E.2 0 6 This
focus reduces the necessary time and expenditures without di-
minishing test quality.20 7 These relatively inexpensive progres-
sive models can be used to improve test efficiency and reduce
the expenditures associated with OT&E. 20 8
Finally, mandatory OT&E creates obvious savings opportuni-
ties and could easily pay for itself. Early deficiency exposure in
mandatory OT&E could prevent calamitous purchases such as
the T-3. In the case of the T-3, the Air Force purchased its fleet
for nearly $40 million only to dispose of the planes as scrap
metal and sacrifice virtually its entire investment.20 9 Avoiding
similar financial disasters would allow this statutory modification
to pay for itself.
The relative ease in which test costs can be reduced further
justifies mandatory OT&E for COTS aircraft acquisitions. Amer-
ican soldiers deserve the maximum protection possible from the
potentially fatal consequences caused by the failure of these pro-
grams. Mandatory operational test and evaluation would pro-
vide this protection. A statutory change mandating OT&E for
potentially perilous products would memorialize the lessons of
the T-3A Firefly and take a significant step towards preventing
similar tragedies in the future.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 21.
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